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Abstract
Understanding the notion of a model is not always easy in logic courses. Hence, tools such as
Euler diagrams are frequently applied as informal illustrations of set-theoretical models. We
formally investigate Euler diagrams as an introduction to set-theoretical models. We show that
the model-theoretic notions of validity and invalidity are characterized by Euler diagrams, and,
in particular, that model construction can be described as a manipulation of Euler diagrams.
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1 Introduction
Logic is traditionally studied from the different viewpoints of syntax and semantics. From
the syntactic viewpoint, formal proofs are investigated using proof systems such as natural
deduction and sequent calculus. From the semantic viewpoint, set-theoretical models of
sentences are usually investigated. In contrast to a proof, which shows the validity of a given
inference, we usually disprove an inference by constructing a counter-model. A counter-
model is one in which all premises of a given inference are true, but its conclusion is false.
The notions of proofs and models are traditionally defined in the fundamentally different
frameworks of syntax and semantics, respectively, and the completeness theorem, one of the
most basic theorems of logic, provides a bridge between them. In university courses, logic is
usually taught along such lines.
As the notion of a proof appears naturally in mathematics courses, students are, to some
extent, familiar with it. However, the notion of a model can be difficult for beginners. A set-
theoretical model consists of a domain of entities and sets, and an interpretation function that
assigns truth values to sentences. Models are usually defined symbolically in the same way as
syntax, and beginners often find it difficult to distinguish between syntax and semantics, as
well as to understand the notion of the interpretation of symbols. Thus, some diagrams are
used to introduce set-theoretical models. One famous example is Tarski’s World of Barwise
and Etchemendy [1], which is designed to introduce model theoretic notions diagrammatically.
Another traditional example concerns Euler diagrams, which were originally introduced in
the 18th century to illustrate syllogisms. A basic Euler diagram consists of circles and points,
and syllogistic sentences are represented using inclusion and exclusion relations between the
circles and points. A circle in an Euler diagram can be considered to represent a set, and a
point can be considered as an entity of a given domain. Inclusion and exclusion relations
between circles and points can then be considered to represent set-theoretical notions such
as subset and disjointness relations, respectively.
Besides the traditional informal semantic view, Euler diagrams have recently been
investigated syntactically as the counterparts of logical formulas, which constitute formal
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proofs. Euler diagrams are rigorously defined as syntactic objects, allowing set-theoretical
semantics to be defined. Inference systems are also formalized, and they have been shown to
be equivalent to some symbolic logical systems. Consequently, fundamental logical properties
such as soundness and completeness have been investigated (e.g., [7, 5, 6]). In this way, Euler
diagrams are, on the one hand, regarded as models of given sentences, and on the other hand,
they are exploited as syntactic objects that constitute formal proofs.
In this paper, we present a formal investigation of Euler diagrams as set-theoretical
models. We characterize the notions of validity and invalidity using our Euler diagrams.
(In [2], Barwise and Etchemendy also suggested a possible application of Euler diagrams
to construct counter-examples.) The advantages of our view of Euler diagrams as models
are as follows: (1) diagrams provide concrete images of set-theoretical models and counter-
models; (2) diagrams provide natural images of the interpretation of sentences; (3) model
and counter-model construction can be captured as concrete manipulations of diagrams.
However, there are the following limitations: (1) the expressive power of our diagrams is
restricted to conjunctions of extended syllogistic sentences; (2) not all sets are represented by
the circles or simple closed curves of our diagrams; (3) diagrams are sometimes misleading if
their meaning and manipulations are not precisely defined. Regardless, Euler diagrams have
recently been defined rigorously from logical viewpoints, and we believe that this restricted
fragment is sufficient for an introduction to model theory.
In Section 2, we first review the Euler diagrammatic system of [6], in which Euler diagrams
are regarded as syntactic objects corresponding to first-order formulas. Then, in Section 3,
we investigate a view of Euler diagrams as counterparts of set-theoretical models. Finally,
we investigate how Euler diagrams provide counter-models of given inferences in Section 4.
2 Euler diagrams as syntactic objects
Our sentences have the following extended syllogistic form:
a is B, a is not B, There is something B, There is something not B,
All A are B, No A are B, Some A are B, Some A are not B,
where a is a constant and A,B are predicates. These basic sentences are denoted by
S, S1, S2, . . . , and we also consider their conjunctions.
From a semantic viewpoint, every constant a is interpreted as an element I(a), and a
predicate B is interpreted as a nonempty set I(B) in a set-theoretical domain. Then, our
syllogistic sentences are interpreted as usual. For example, a is B is true iff I(a) ∈ I(B);
All A are B is true iff I(A) ⊆ I(B), and so on (cf. [6]). Note that we impose the so-called
existential import, i.e., the interpretation of B is nonempty. See Remark after Example 12.
We first review the Euler diagrammatic system of [6], in which Euler diagrams are
regarded as syntactic objects corresponding to formulas.
I Definition 1. Our Euler diagram, called EUL-diagram, is defined as a plane with named
circles (simple closed curves, denoted by A,B,C, . . . ) and named points (p, p1, p2, . . . ).
Named points are divided into constant points (a, b, c, . . . ), which correspond to constants
of the first-order language, and existential points (x, y, z, . . . ), which correspond to bound
variables associated with the existential quantifier. Diagrams are denoted by D, E ,D1,D2, . . . .
Each diagram is specified by the following inclusion, exclusion, and crossing relations
maintained between circles and points.
R. Takemura 225
I Definition 2. EUL-relations consist of the following reflexive asymmetric binary relation
@, and the irreflexive symmetric binary relations a` and ./:
A @ B “the interior of A is inside of the interior of B,”
A a` B “the interior of A is outside of the interior of B,”
A ./ B “there is at least one crossing point between A and B,”
p @ A “p is inside of the interior of A,”
p a` A “p is outside of the interior of A,”
p a` q “p is outside of q (i.e., p is not located at point q).”
EUL-relations are denoted by R,R1, R2, . . . .
The set of EUL-relations that hold on a diagram D is uniquely determined, and we denote
this set by rel(D). For example, rel(S1 + S2) in Example 3 is {x @ A, x @ B, x @ C,A ./ B,
A ./ C,B @ C}. In the description of rel(D), we omit the reflexive relation s @ s for each
object s. Furthermore, we often omit relations of the form p a` q for points p and q, which
always hold by definition. In the following, we consider the equivalence class of diagrams in
terms of the EUL-relations.
To clarify the intended meaning of our diagrams, we describe the translation of diagrams
into the usual first-order formulas. See [10, 11] for a detailed description of our translation.
Each named circle is translated into a unary predicate, and each constant (resp. existential)
point is translated into a constant symbol (resp. variable). Then, each EUL-relation R is
translated into a formula R◦ as follows:
(p @ A)◦ := A(p); (p a` A)◦ := ¬A(p);
(A @ B)◦ := ∀x(A(x)→ B(x)); (A a` B)◦ := ∀x(A(x)→ ¬B(x));
(A ./ B)◦ := ∀x((A(x)→ A(x)) ∧ (B(x)→ B(x))).
Let D be an EUL-diagram with the following set of relations: rel(D) = {R1, . . . , Ri, x1A1,
. . . , x1Ak, . . . , xlA1, . . . , xlAk}, where  is @ or a`, and no existential point appears in
R1, . . . , Ri. Then, the diagram D is translated into the following conjunctive formula:
D◦ := R◦1 ∧ · · · ∧R◦i ∧ ∃x1(A1(x1) ∧ · · · ∧Ak(x1)) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xl(A1(xl) ∧ · · · ∧Ak(xl)),
where A(x) is A(x) or ¬A(x) depending on .
Note that our diagram is abstractly a “conjunction of relations.” Note also that we
interpret the ./-relation so that it does not convey any specific (inclusion or exclusion)
information about the relationship between circles. (This interpretation is based on the
convention of Venn diagrams. See [6] for further details.) Thus, A ./ B is translated into a
tautology as above.
From a semantic viewpoint, by interpreting circles (resp. points) as nonempty subsets (resp.
elements) of a set-theoretical domain, each “syntactic object” EUL-diagram is interpreted in
terms of the relations that hold on it. See [6] for details.
I Remark. Our system is essentially the same as the region connection calculus RCC [8].
RCC is a topological approach to qualitative spatial representation and reasoning, and is
applied, for example, to Geographic Information System (GIS). RCC investigates eight basic
relations, including our inclusion, exclusion, and crossing (partially overlapping), between
spatial regions (circles in our framework). Although RCC investigates general n-dimensional
spaces of spatial regions, we concentrate on 2-dimensional diagrams. Thus, without any
named points, our system can be considered as a subsystem of RCC. See, for example, [3, 4]
for surveys of RCC.
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We next review the Euler diagrammatic inference system of [6], called the Generalized
Diagrammatic Syllogistic inference system GDS. GDS consists of two kinds of inference
rules: Deletion and Unification. Deletion allows us to delete a circle or point from a given
diagram. Unification allows us to unify two diagrams into one diagram in which the semantic
information is equivalent to the conjunction of the original two diagrams.
I Example 3. Some A are B, All B are C |= Some A are C
The validity of the given inference is shown by the Unifica-
tion of the two diagrams S1 and S2, which represent the
given premises. In this unification, circle B in S1 and S2 is
identified, and C is added to S1 so that B is inside C and
C overlaps with A without any implication of a specific
relationship between A and C. S3, which represents the
given conclusion, is then obtained by deleting B.


A
•x

B
S1
nB
ff
C
S2Hj 


B"!
# 
C


A •x
S1 + S2 ?

ff
CA •x
S3
Two types of constraint are imposed on Unification. One is the constraint for determinacy,
which blocks disjunctive ambiguity with respect to the location of points, and the other is
the constraint for consistency, which blocks representing inconsistent information in a single
diagram. Unification can only be applied when these constraints are satisfied.
The notion of diagrammatic proof, or d-proof for short, is defined inductively as
a tree structure consisting of Unification and Deletion steps. The provability relation ` is
defined as usual in terms of the existence of a d-proof. See [6, 9] for details.
GDS is shown to be sound and complete with respect to our set-theoretical semantics.
To avoid introducing the diagrammatic counterpart of the so-called absurdity rule in our
system, we impose a consistency condition on the set of premise diagrams D1, . . . ,Dn in our
formulation of completeness, i.e., the set of premise diagrams has a model. See [6, 9] for
further discussion and a detailed proof.
I Proposition 1. Let D1, . . . ,Dn be consistent. E is a semantic consequence of D1, . . . ,Dn
(D1, . . . ,Dn |= E) if and only if E is provable from D1, . . . ,Dn (D1, . . . ,Dn ` E) in GDS.
Note that the above completeness is obtained by regarding diagrams as “syntactic objects”,
corresponding to first-order formulas, and by defining appropriate set-theoretical semantics.
We next investigate a view of Euler diagrams as counterparts of set-theoretical models.
3 Euler diagrams as models
By regarding our diagrams as models, we define the truth condition for our sentences.
I Definition 4. Constants are interpreted as named points, predicates are circles. Then, for
a diagram D:
a is B holds on D iff named point a is located inside circle B;
a is not B holds on D iff named point a is located outside circle B;
All A are B holds on D iff A @ B holds on D;
No A are B holds on D iff A a` B holds on D;
Some A are B holds on D iff there exists an existential point x in the intersection of A
and B;
Some A are not B holds on D iff there exists an existential point x inside A and outside
B.
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We write D  S when sentence S holds on diagram D.
I Example 5. Some A are B holds on each of the following diagrams, for example.

ff
A
ff
B
•x
D1
Affifl
fi
B
•x
D2
Bffifl
fi
A
•x
D3
Affifl
fi
B
•xC
D4


A

B
•x

E
D5
We define the notion of Euler diagrammatic validity in the same way as model-
theoretic validity.
I Definition 6. For n 6= 0, S1, . . . , Sn  S if S holds on any diagram D on which S1, . . . , Sn
hold (i.e., ∀D.D  ∧Si ⇒ D  S).
In our Unification of GDS, as illustrated in Example 3, when the relationship between
circles cannot be determined as @ or a` from the given premises, we assign this to be a
./-relation without any implication. However, if we extend the notion of “unification” to
allow additional implications (and hence, such that this “unification” is invalid) as long as
all relations on premises are preserved, then we can describe model construction in terms of
the extended “unification” as follows.
I Example 7. Some A are B, All B are C  Some A are C
Various diagrams can represent the given premises, and there are various ways to “unify” these
diagrams (using Deletion if necessary). The following describes three possible diagrams, and
the conclusion Some A are C holds in each of them. Cf. Example 3, where the representations
of sentences are fixed canonically in a one-to-one correspondence depending on each sentence,
and the way of unification is also fixed uniquely.


A
•x

B
S1
nB
ff
C
S2@R  	


B

ffi
fi
fl
C


A •x
S1 + S2
B
ff
A
•x
S1
nB
ff
C
S2@R  	

ff
C
"!
# 
A
B•x
S1 + S2
B
ff
A
•x
S1
nB
ff
C
S2@R  	
&%
'$
C
&%
'$
A B•x
S1 + S2
It is shown that the canonical form of the diagram for every sentence (e.g., D1 in Example
5 for Some A are B) is sufficient to consider the usual model-theoretic validity. Then, through
the completeness of GDS, it is shown that Euler diagrammatic validity of Definition 6 is
equivalent to the usual model-theoretic validity.
4 Euler diagrams for counter-models
Models can be practically applied to disprove given inferences. Let us consider how to
disprove a given inference using Euler diagrams.
I Example 8. Some A are B, All B are C 6|= All A are C
These premises are the same as in Example 3. To construct a
diagram to falsify the given conclusion All A are C, we add a fresh
existential point y to the unified diagram S1 + S2 of Example 3
as follows.


B&%
'$
C

ff
A
•xy•
S1 + S2 + y
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The existential point y denotes that “there exists something that is A but not C,” i.e., the
negation of All A are C. Note that even after the addition of y, all of the @, a` relations that
hold on the premises (x @ A and x @ B on S1, and B @ C on S2) are maintained. Hence,
the above S1 + S2 + y neatly illustrates a counter-model of the given inference in which all
premises are true but the conclusion is false.
Let us define our counter-diagrams.
I Definition 9. A diagram E is a counter-diagram of D, and vice versa, when one of the
following holds between D and E :
a @ B holds on D, and a a` B holds on E ;
A @ B holds on D, and, for some x, x @ A and x a` B hold on E ;
A a` B holds on D, and, for some x, x @ A and x @ B hold on E .
Note that our diagram is abstractly a conjunction of relations, and the above definition
lists the so-called “counter-relation” for every relation. As illustrated in Example 10, there
may be a number of counter-diagrams for a given diagram D, because a counter-diagram of
D may contain circles and points that are irrelevant to D. Thus, in general, the notions of
a counter-diagram of D and the negation of D, which should be uniquely determined, are
different.
I Example 10. Let D be the following diagram on the left. Then, all of D6,D7,D8, and D9
are counter-diagrams of D. Thus, a diagram and its counter-diagram do not necessarily share
the same circles and points, and it is sufficient that a relation that holds on a counter-diagram
falsifies a relation of the given diagram.

ff
A
•x
ff
B
ff
C
D


A 

B

C
D6

ff
C
•z
ff
A
•x
ff
B
D7
B
ff
C
D8


A B
ff
E
D9
We can list all of the operations to construct counter-diagrams, such as the addition of
a new point illustrated in Example 8. However, let us consider another way to construct
counter-diagrams. Theoretically speaking, S1, . . . , Sn 6 T means that there exists a D such
that D  S1∧· · ·∧Sn∧¬T . Based on this fact, we construct a diagram that falsifies the given
conclusion, and, by unifying the diagram with all premises, we construct a counter-diagram
for the given inference. We formalize our counter-diagram construction according to this
idea. Let us reconsider the inference in Example 8.
I Example 11. Some A are B, All B are C 6|= All A are C
Let E ′ be a diagram such that rel(E ′) = {y @ A, y a` C,A ./ C}, which represents Some A
are not C, and which falsifies the given conclusion All A are C. We unify this E ′ with S1
and S2, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Thus, the resulting diagram S1 + S2 + E ′ is the same as
S1 + S2 + y in Example 8, and disproves the given inference.
Let us examine another example.
I Example 12. No A are B, There is something C 6|= No A are C
Let E ′ be a diagram such that rel(E ′) = {y @ A, y @ C,A ./ C}, which represents Some A
are C, and which falsifies the given conclusion No A are C. We then unify this E ′ with the
given premise S3, representing No A are B, as illustrated in Fig. 2. When we further attempt
to unify diagram S4, in which {x @ C} holds, representing There is something C, we find
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
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•x
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B
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

A
•xy•
S1 + S2 + E ′
Figure 1 Construction of a counter-diagram (Example 11)
three possibilities for the position of x, that is, x is indeterminate with respect to circles A
and B, and we cannot unify this from our valid Unification rules. However, whichever of the
three possibilities gives the position of x, we obtain a counter-diagram to disprove the given
inference. For example, E ′′ in Fig. 2 is a required counter-diagram.

ff
A y•
ff
C
E ′
A B
S3


C
•x
S4@R  	

ff
A y•
ff
C

B
E ′ + S3

ff
A y•
ff
C
•x

B
E ′′
Figure 2 (Example 12)
Because we cannot obtain the above E ′′ from E ′ + S3 and S4 using our valid Unification rules
of GDS, we construct counter-diagrams by introducing another “invalid” rule: invalid Point
Insertion (iPI). This arbitrarily fixes the position of a point from several possibilities. Then,
we obtain E ′′ from E ′ + S3 and S4.
In this way, a given inference is shown to be invalid by: (1) constructing a diagram that
falsifies the given conclusion; and (2) unifying the diagram of (1) with all premises. In the
resulting diagram, the relation falsifies the given conclusion and all of the @ and a` relations
of the given premises hold. Hence, it is a counter-diagram for the given inference.
I Remark. In our system, we postulate the so-called existential import in the literature of
syllogisms. With this postulate, for example, we have All A are B, No B are C |= Some A are
not C, even though this is not valid from the usual logical viewpoint without the existential
import. Without this postulate, two diagrams, say D in which A @ B holds and E in which
A a` B holds, are consistent when A denotes the empty set. However, it is difficult to express
D and E in a single diagram, as our system lacks a device to express the emptiness of circles.
Even if we introduce another device such as “shading”, which expresses the emptiness of the
corresponding region (cf. [7]), there remains a question as to whether we draw the shaded
circle A inside or outside B (whichever is legal in an abstract sense). Thus, it seems that the
assumption of the existential import is natural for our Euler diagrammatic system.
Let us define our counter-diagrammatic proofs.
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I Definition 13. A counter-diagrammatic proof, or counter-d-proof for short, of E
under D1, . . . ,Dn is a tree structure:
consisting of valid Unification rules and invalid iPI;
whose premises are D1, . . . ,Dn, E ′, where E ′ is a counter-diagram of E such that no
existential point of E ′ appears on D1, . . . ,Dn;
in whose conclusion, all @, a`-relations of D1, . . . ,Dn, E ′ hold.
We write D1, . . . ,Dn 99K E when there exists a counter-d-proof of E under D1, . . . ,Dn.
Note that we may not use the invalid iPI as illustrated in Example 11. Additionally,
we can freely choose a counter-diagram E ′ to add to the premises of a counter-d-proof.
Hence, it may be the case that E ′ is itself a required conclusion of a counter-d-proof. In our
proof of Proposition 2 below, we present a canonical method to choose E ′ and construct
counter-d-proofs. See [11] for further details.
Although space limitations prevent us from going into detail, there exists an invalid
inference for which we cannot construct a counter-d-proof in our framework of inclusion,
exclusion, and crossing relations. Thus, we need to restrict the position of existential points
appearing in a given conclusion. We call a diagram “relational” if the position of every
existential point in the diagram is determined by relations with at most two circles. See
[11] for a detailed discussion. Thus, we have shown that our counter-d-proofs sufficiently
characterize the notion of invalidity.
I Proposition 2. Let D1, . . . ,Dn be consistent, and E be relational. E is not a valid conclusion
of D1, . . . ,Dn (i.e., D1, . . . ,Dn 6|= E) if and only if there exists a counter-d-proof of E under
D1, . . . ,Dn (i.e., D1, . . . ,Dn 99K E).
There is no need to worry about relational diagrams when we consider the usual syllogisms
or transitive inference, where a conclusion diagram consists of only two circles, and it is
already relational. We require the restriction when we consider a more general diagram as a
conclusion, in which only a particular existential point makes the given inference invalid. See
[11].
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